Moldova deals again?

The new deal about Moldova’s future is discussed between Moldovan Communist President Voronin and Russian President Putin. Since 2003, when Russia negotiated a secret agreement with Moldova about the Transnistrian conflict resolution, there were a lot of speculation about a possible new deal. The first, 2003 deal was a bad one, imposed Russian control over the Moldovan parliament and ensured a “no-EU approach” of Moldova towards West. The West warned Moldova in 2003 not to sign such a deal and later helped Moldova financially.

Despite that bad deal and despite 2004-2006 period of Moldovan friendship with West, local political analysts and parties always feared of a “Kozak 2” deal. The questions was never “what for”, but always “when?”. It seems that only few have actually built some faith in the current communist leadership, while others, including Communist partners, were always in a standby.

Now the two Presidents finally meet, which was not the case before, when Russia was “upset” with Moldovan Europeanism and a more membership in GUAM and when Russia imposed winter gas shortcuts and wine embargo on Moldova. It seems the misunderstandings were overcome meanwhile. Most of the Moldova observers would generally agree that the main stake here, rudely speaking, is the Moldovan submission to Russia. The “submission” actually and pretty fairly sums up the Russian desires towards this country – Russian economic preferential investments, imports to Russia mainly from companies with Russian capital, total control over the energy supply and distribution and Russian citizens as Moldovan MPs. Some of these are already achieved, while others are the Russian goals, which it considers as fair and of its own exclusive ownership. Therefore, despite the conventional “what has Moldovan President promised to Mr. Putin” the question is not “what” Moldovan had to offer Russia, but “how”.

President Voronin recently held a meeting with the foreign Ambassadors accredited to Chisinau (Moldovan capital). His speech explains to an observer, who followed up the Moldovan crisis in 2003, what is President’s current plan with Russia. The President and his advisors closely followed the 2003 events and now adjusted the Kozak deal to comfort the West on two major points:
1. In 2003 the West has advised the President to reject a deal with Russia mainly on the basis that it does not provide a fair, international peacekeeping deal with Western participation and because Russia wants to have a long term military presence in Moldova (at that time – soon to be an EU and NATO neighbor);
2. However, the political part of the Russian deal that presumed Russian veto over Moldovan decision making, drafted by presidential envoy Kozak, was not that much criticized. On contrary it was suggested that the Russian draft has good ideas that can be used for a joint West-East document to be jointly discussed later, in the so-called 5+2 conflict resolution format. Moreover the American lead Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Moldova has incorporated parts of the Kozak document into its own draft;

Future Western implication in conflict resolution was a peace-keeping like monitoring Mission by EU – the EU Border Assitance Mission (EUBAM), which is monitoring the border activities between Moldova and Ukraine. Moldovans also believe that Brussels based institutions, both EU and NATO, are quite ready to support the idea of an international peacekeeping mission. However, they shy away from a more active political involvement, where these institutions would have to discomfort Russia, which is an European taboo.

The European Integration euphoria that dominated Moldova leaders in 2004-2006 is over. They realized that for an EU integration there is a difficult “homework” to do and that the “homework” may interfere with their personal business plans. The governing Communists also lost electors’ support in the capital city of Chisinau, and in two thirds of the country. The President is presumably in dire need of an image boost in order to brings his departure plans to completion. These plans presume a partial hand-over of power, a fictitious pension during which he would control his successor and the political scene, very much like Putin’s. For that, it is widely believed in Moldovan political circles, he wants the aura of country’s only unifier that would ensure him undisputed power.

It is therefore easier to presume that the new deal between Voronin and Putin would accommodate Russia more than the West and despite Moldovan initial drafts and requests for a “good document” the new deal will be a remake of the old Kozak plan. It would not accommodated Moldova interest as much as it would accommodate Russian ones, and meanwhile it would be careful to accommodate the West in those parts where it was rejected initially – military versus politically.

There were no much talk about why President Voronin repeats steadily that there will be no foreign troops on the territory of Moldova – one can see now that Voronin accommodates the West about that part of the original Kozak plan that was rejected by the EU and NATO in 2003. At the same time he spelled out even earlier some of the provisions of the political settlement plan that are in line with Kozak proposals in 2003 which were not rejected by the West.

It can be presumed that President Voronin tries to accommodate West’s military worries to Russian political desires in order to have personal and political gains. However, what about Moldova?